Ebro III vs NLRC : 110187 : September 4, 1996 : J Mendoza : Second... 3 of 5 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/sept1996/110187.htm b) Whether a mere Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs with respondent International Catholic Migration Commission, which is not a law, can divest the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission of their jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of respondents in the pending case; c) Whether the Memorandum of Agreement may be given retroactive effect; d) Whether the dismissal of the case based on the claim of immunity will deprive petitioner of his property without due process of law; e) Whether the dismissal of the case based on the claim of immunity will result in the impairment of the obligations assumed by respondent International Catholic Migration Commission under its contract of employment with petitioner; f) Assuming for the sake of argument that the Memorandum of Agreement has validly conferred immunity on private respondents, whether they may be considered as having waived such immunity; g) Upon the same consideration, whether private respondents may be considered estopped from claiming immunity. The basic issue in this case is whether the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 15, 1988 gave ICMC immunity from suit. The Court holds it did. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. First. Petitioners contention that the Memorandum of Agreement is not an act of Congress which is needed to repeal or supersede the provision of the Labor Code on the jurisdiction of the NLRC and of the Labor Arbiter is untenable. The grant of immunity to ICMC is in virtue of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1947, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on May 17, 1949. This Convention has the force and effect of law, considering that under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of [3] international law as part of the law of the land. The Memorandum of Agreement in question merely carries out the Philippine governments obligation under the Convention. In International [4] Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, this Court explained the grant of immunity to ICMC in this wise: The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC . . . is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. Second. Petitioner argues that in any case ICMCs immunity can not apply because this case was filed below before the signing of the Memorandum on July 15, 1988. Petitioner cites in support the statement of this Court in the aforesaid case of International Catholic Migration [5] [6] Commission v. Calleja, distinguishing that case from an earlier case also involving ICMC, wherein the NLRC, as well as the Court, took cognizance of a complaint against ICMC for payment of salary for the unexpired portion of a six-month probationary employment. The Court [7] held: [N]ot only did the facts of said controversy [ICMC v. NLRC, 169 SCRA 606 (1989)] occur between 1983-1985, or before the grant to ICMC on 15 July 1988 of the status of a specialized agency with 1/20/2016 12:16 PM