"With the above conclusion, it is clear that the accused had overstayed in jail." 5. The Court further failed to take into consideration that "double jeopardy" exists when Judge P. Laguio, Jr. convicted accused Billaber to life sentence in Criminal Case nos. 92-108577-78 when on April 5, 1994, Judge Laguio, Jr. promulgated the decision convicting accused Billaber without taking into consideration that the other two (2) appealed cases before Judge David G. Nitafan were already dismissed since March 20, 1995. Judge Laguio failed to take "judicial notice" of the March 20, 1994, dismissal order leaving the uncorroborated testimony of complainant Raul Durano. 6. Judge Perfecto AS. Laguio, Jr. committed "falsification" by antedating his decision to February 24, 1994, upon realizing that the accused Billaber was ordered released from the City Jail when he promulgated his "alleged decision" on April 5, 1994, or forty (40) days late — if ever he had the decision prepared as early as February 24, 1994, when he had no valid or plausible reason to delay the promulgation of his very late decision when the case was terminated on November 24, 1993, and submitted for decision when the erring judge took him five (5) months (November 24, 1993 to April 5, 1994) to decide after he had taken "judicial notice" that Judge David G. Nitafan had already dismissed accused Billaber for having "overstayed in jail" in the application of the mandatory provision of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code on simultaneous service of one year in Criminal Case Nos. 28691920 as promulgated by Judge Aida Rangel Roque of Branch 24, Metropolitan Trial Court, City of Manila, when accused has already served THREE YEARS AND FOUR MOS. from his illegal arrest on July 25, 1992, up to the present – November 15, 1995, deprived of his liberty. 7. The Court a quo erred in holding accused guilty of "illegal recruitment" as charged when only one (1) case of "Estafa" with Raul Durano as complaining witness was well within the competent jurisdiction of Judge Perfecto AS. Laguio, Jr. as the other two "estafa" cases filed by Elizabeth Genteroy and Teresina Onza were already DISMISSED on March 24, 1994, two weeks ahead of the delayed promulgation of the questioned decision of Judge Laguio on April 5, 1994, antedating the same decision to February 24, 1994, and after five (5) months from the time the case was submitted for decision on November 24, 1993.47 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not considering that he was accosted without a warrant on 25 July 1992. The details of the alleged arrest are sketchy at best. It appears that appellant was brought to the police station, together with private complainant Durano, not because of the present charges but because of the commotion that ensued between the two at the canteen of the Emilio Aguinaldo College.48 At the police station, Durano and the two other private complainants then executed statements charging appellant with illegal recruitment and estafa.49 Any question, if at all, as to whether there was an actual arrest 50 or whether, in the commotion, appellant committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit an offense,51 have been rendered moot. Appellant did not allege any irregularity in a motion to quash before entering his plea,52 and is therefore deemed to have waived any question of the trial court’s jurisdiction over his person.53 Appellant also maintains that he was denied his right to counsel while he was at the police station. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense has, among other rights, the right to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. 54 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence against the accused. 55 The allegation that appellant was deprived his right to counsel, even if true, would not alter the outcome of this case for it does not appear that the prosecution offered in court any confession or admission obtained as a consequence of an un-counseled custodial investigation. The claim that the pre-trial conference and the trial were repeatedly postponed in violation of appellant’s right to speedy trial is not supported by the record. After appellant’s arraignment and plea on 6 October 1992, the trial court scheduled the pre-trial conference for 12 November 1992.56 On the latter date, the trial court, upon appellant’s own instance, issued an Order dispensing with the pre-trial conference.57 In the same Order, the trial court set the date for trial on 15 December 1992. 58 Private complainants, however, failed to appear on said date, prompting the defense to move for the dismissal of the case.59 The trial court denied the motion since it was only the first time that the private complainants failed to appear.60 The trial court then reset the trial to 22 December 1992, warning that "should the prosecution witnesses fail to appear, [the court] will be constrained to dismiss [the] case… for failure to prosecute."61 The records further reveal that on 22 December 1992, the court again reset the trial to 19 January 1993, this time with the "agreement of both the prosecution and the defense."62 The prosecution conducted the direct examination of private complainant Raul Durano in the trial of 19 January 1993, but his cross-examination was postponed to 28 January and 2 February 1993 for lack of time. 63 Evidently, the trial court had to hear two other cases awaiting trial on the same day. 64 Over the defense’s objection, the hearing of 28 January 1993 was again postponed when private complainants Genteroy and Durano, who were present in court, left because they thought that trial would not push through that morning.65 Trial proceeded until 24 November 1993, when the defense rested. 66 Other than the 30 September 1993 hearing, when the accused asked for postponement because of his counsel’s absence,67 trial was continuous. The Constitution mandates that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a speedy trial.68 The right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.69 None of these circumstances attended the proceedings below. Only twice did the prosecution fail to present a witness, resulting in the resetting of the trial, once on the private complainants’ erroneous belief that the hearing was not going to push through. That the cross-examination of private