11/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Discussion[18] dated July 28, 2016, counters that the CA did not err when it reversed the Labor Arbiter's and NLRC's decisions. He also insists that he vehemently disputed the allegations of gross misconduct and willfull disobedience, contrary to the assertions by the petitioners. Moreover, he maintains that the petitioners failed to afford him due process when they decided to suddenly terminate his employment. He points out that in their position paper, the petitioners themselves admitted that they did not provide him with written notices of the charges against him and of his dismissal. In sum, Constantino contends that the CA correctly ruled that the petitioners failed to prove by substantial evidence the charges of insubordination, serious misconduct, and willfull disobedience. The Court's Ruling The petition lacks merit. Petitioners failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Constantino's dismissal was grounded on just and valid causes. It is settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.[19] For this purpose, the employer must present substantial evidence to prove the legality of an employee's dismissal.[20] "Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."[21] In this case, the Court concurs with the appellate court's conclusion that the petitioners failed to establish the validity of Constantino's dismissal by substantial evidence. It must be recalled that in their attempt to prove the validity of Constantino's dismissal, one of the documents presented by the petitioners is Capt. Kolidas' facsimile message dated February 1, 2008. As observed by the appellate court, however, the said document is dubious considering that it was transmitted only on February 20, 2008, or 6 days after Constantino was informed of his dismissal. To this observation by the appellate court, the petitioners' only response was to point out that while the transmission date was indeed on February 20, 2008, it could not be denied that the facsimile message was dated February 1, 2008. They assert that under Section 17(D) of the POEA-SEC, Capt. Kolidas, as the master of the vessel, has the authority to dismiss a seafarer-employee even without furnishing the seafarer with a notice of dismissal if there exists a clear danger to the safety of the crew or vessel, and that the only duty of the master of the vessel is to submit" a complete report to the manning agency after the incident. Thus, it would seem that the petitioners are implying that the February 1, 2008, facsimile message was transmitted only on February 20, 2008, because it constitutes as Capt. Kolidas' report after the fact of dismissal pursuant to Section 17(D) of the POEA-SEC. The arguments and insinuations by the petitioners are not supported even by their own https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65452 6/14