6/7/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Further, a reading of the introductory provisions of DOJ Circular No. 41 shows that it emanates from the DOJ's assumption of powers that is not actually conferred to it. In one of the whereas clauses of the issuance, it was stated, thus: WHEREAS, while several Supreme Court circulars, issued through the Office of the Court Administrator, clearly state that "[HDO] shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [RTCs]," said circulars are, however, silent with respect to cases falling within the jurisdiction of courts below the RTC as well as those pending determination by government prosecution offices; Apparently, the DOJ's predicament which led to the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 was the supposed inadequacy of the issuances of this Court pertaining to HDOs, the more pertinent of which is SC Circular No. 39-97.[119] It is the DOJ's impression that with the silence of the circular with regard to the issuance of HDOs in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC and those still pending investigation, it can take the initiative in filling in the deficiency. It is doubtful, however, that the DOJ Secretary may undertake such action since the issuance of HDOs is an exercise of this Court's inherent power "to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused."[120] It is an exercise of judicial power which belongs to the Court alone, and which the DOJ, even as the principal law agency of the government, does not have the authority to wield. Moreover, the silence of the circular on the matters which are being addressed by DOJ Circular No. 41 is not without good reasons. Circular No. 39-97 was specifically issued to avoid indiscriminate issuance of HDOs resulting to the inconvenience of the parties affected as the same could amount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel. Contrary to the understanding of the DOJ, the Court intentionally held that the issuance of HDOs shall pertain only to criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, to the exclusion of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC and all other cases. The intention was made clear with the use of the term "only." The reason lies in seeking equilibrium between the state's interest over the prosecution of the case considering the gravity of the offense involved and the individual's exercise of his right to travel. Thus, the circular permits the intrusion on the right to travel only when the criminal case filed against the individual is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, or those that pertains to more serious crimes or offenses that are punishable with imprisonment of more than six years. The exclusion of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the MTC is justified by the fact that they pertain to less serious offenses which is not commensurate with the curtailment of a fundamental right. Much less is the reason to impose restraint on the right to travel of respondents of criminal cases still pending investigation since at that stage no information has yet been filed in court against them. It is for these reasons that Circular No. 39-97 mandated that FIDO may only be issued in criminal cases filed with the RTC and withheld the same power from the MTC. Remarkably, in DOJ Circular No. 41, the DOJ Secretary went overboard by assuming powers which have been withheld from the lower courts in Circular No. 39-97. In the questioned circular, the DOJ Secretary may issue HDO against the accused in criminal elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/64165 25/70