That submission to the NPC also contained a section on carbon dioxide as an atmospheric pollutant, but did not reference either the initial nor supplementary report from Robinson and Robbins. Instead, it relied almost entirely on a 1965 publication from the American Association for the Advancement of Science called “Air Conservation.”56 The four-page section in “Air Conservation” on carbon dioxide—reproduced almost entirely in the NPC report—was considerably more equivocal than the 1968 assessment, and failed to mention Revelle’s landmark paper from 1957 as well as several other leading assessments.57 We can say with confidence that, by 1968 the latest, the petroleum industry as a whole was on notice of climate change, what was causing it, and what its risks were. We know that the committee to which the report was submitted was comprised of 20 industry executives from member companies, and that the discussion of carbon dioxide in the report was acknowledged by internal API documents in 1972. Finally, we know that, also in 1972, the industry acknowledged the existence of the report in a submission to the government, but did not include its warnings regarding carbon dioxide. From 1977 to 1982 Exxon Scientists Repeatedly Confirm the Science of Climate Change Investigations and document releases have demonstrated that, by no later than the late 1970s, scientists employed by Exxon were reiterating to top management both the degree of certainty within the science and the scale of possible impacts. In 1977, Exxon scientist James Black informed the company’s management committee that climate change driven by fossil fuel use posed a significant global threat.58 Later that same year, an interoffice memo from Henry Shaw, another Exxon scientist, noted that the “CO2 problem … is the most important man-made weather problem that we have to contend with.”59 In May 1978, Black gave a presentation that included a prediction that a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere would produce a temperature increase of two to three degrees Celsius. He noted that, despite any uncertainties about the state of science at the time, “there is no guarantee that better knowledge will lessen rather than “[M]an has a time window of five to augment the severity of the predictions.”60 He reiterated that ten years before the need for hard the growth in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was due decisions regarding changes in primarily to fossil fuel combustion, and concluded that “man energy strategies might become has a time window of five to ten years before the need for critical.” hard decisions regarding changes in energy strategies might become critical.”61 By 1980, the scientific consensus was being openly acknowledged by Exxon scientists. Exxon’s December 1980 Technological Forecast warned that “most widely accepted calculations carried on thus 56 Id. at 11. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, AIR CONSERVATION 78-82 (1965). 58 See Memorandum from James F. Black, Scientific Advisor, Exxon Products Research Division, to F. G. Turpin, Vice President, Exxon research and Engineering Co. (Jun. 6, 1978) (on file with InsideClimate News) [hereinafter Black Memorandum], available at https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/James%20Black%201977%20Presentation.pdf. 59 See Memorandum from Henry Shaw to John W. Harrison, regarding “Environmental Effects of Carbon Dioxide” 3 (Oct. 31, 1977) (on file with InsideClimate News), available at https://insideclimatenews.org/sites/default/files/documents/Government%20Meeting%20Memo%20%281977%29.p df. 60 See Black Memorandum, supra note 58, at 1. 61 See id. at 2. 57 10