or other consideration, or (b) due to coercion or influence by an adult, group, or syndicate, indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. There is no question that the sexual abuse of AAA was not for money, profit or other consideration. There is also no dispute that there was no coercion or influence exerted on AAA by Quimvel or any other person for the simple reason that the act of lasciviousness (i.e., caressing her vagina) was done while she was asleep. On this score alone, it is easy to see that AAA does not fall in the definition of a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Accordingly, the evidence negates the application of Section 5(b).[5] Thus, as far as Quimvel is concerned, he can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 in relation to Article 266-A(d) of the RPC and meted the penalty only of prision correccional. Hence, in disposing of this case, there really is no need to further discuss the nuances of the proper application of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Nevertheless, I submit this dissent on the different issues that have been made a part of the majority decision. RA 7610 was not intended to cover all sexual abuses against children. At the outset, I join Justice Carpio's observation that if the intention of RA 7610 is to penalize all sexual abuses against children under its provisions to the exclusion of the RPC, it would have expressly stated so and would have done away with the qualification that the child be "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse."[6] It did not. When the statute speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. Section 5(b) is a provision of specific and limited application, and must be applied as worded-a separate and distinct offense from the "common" or "ordinary" acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. Upon the premise that the language of Section 5(b) is ambiguous and is susceptible to interpretation, I have conscientiously studied the deliberations of RA 7610 to ascertain the intent of the law with respect to how it would interplay with the provisions of the RPC and other laws that penalize the same or similar acts. While the Senate, in its deliberations, would appear to equivocate in the protection of children against all or specific types of abuse, it cannot be escaped that the overriding impetus for the passage of the law is based on a certain recurring theme. Senator Rasul, one of RA 1610's sponsors, in her speech, stated: Senator Rasul. x x x xxxx