complained of. R.A. 7610 does not merely cover a situation wherein a child is being abused for profit as in prostitution, but also one wherein a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation, even if such sexual abuse occurred only once, as in Quimvel's case. Also, based on the definitions above, prostitution which involves an element of habituality - is just one of the several other forms of sexual abuses. Thus, neither habituality nor the fact that the child is exploited in prostitution, is required to be alleged in the information for acts of lasciviousness because Article 336 of the RPC does not so provide. In the same vein, the title of Article III of R.A. 7610 itself is clear that the subsequent provisions thereof pertain not only on the subject of "child prostitution" but also on "other sexual abuse." Under Section 5 thereof, those considered to be under child prostitution are "children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration" "indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct" and those that do not fall under that category are those children, who, "due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" "indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct." This case falls under the second scenario where no money, profit or any other consideration was involved. To construe "other sexual abuse" as referring to any other sexual abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness complained of is wrong. The law did not use such phrase in order to cover other forms of sexual abuse that a child might have previously experienced, other than being exploited in prostitution for profit, or for any other consideration. Instead, the law clearly distinguishes those children who indulged in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit, or any other consideration, from those children who, without money, profit, or any other consideration, had sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. This is further bolstered by the use of the disjunctive word "or" in separating the two contexts contemplated in the law. Thus, it is erroneous to interpret that R.A. 7610 contemplates situations wherein a child, who was already subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse, is again subjected to another abuse or lascivious conduct. Note that in the definition of "child abuse," the phrase "whether habitual or not" is used to describe the frequency upon which a maltreatment can be considered as an abuse. Thus, a single act of abuse is enough for a perpetrator to be considered, as having violated the law. To interpret it otherwise would lead to an absurdity and ambiguity of the law. In Olivarez vs. Court of Appeals,[13] the Court held that a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. The Court found that the 16-year old victim in that case was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. According to the Court, it is