To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. [80] The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code through the issuance of Executive Order No. 227 in 1987. The grant of substantive equal rights to the Filipino spouse was broad enough that this Court, in the 1985 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals,[81] "hinted, by way of obiter dictum"[82] that it could be applied to Filipinos who have since been naturalized as foreign citizens. In Republic v. Orbecido III,[83] this Court noted the obiter in Quita and stated outright that Filipino citizens who later become naturalized as foreign citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino spouses: Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[84] To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's newfound companionship with another cannot be just.[85] Justice is better served if she is not discriminated against in her own country.[86] As much as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within the institution of marriage. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December 16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry. SO ORDERED.