By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State has committed to ensure and to promote gender equality. In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations."[63] This necessarily includes the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse. The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals. The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity between the former spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less financial burden for the family. Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only in the mid-20th century. The Philippines had divorce laws in the past. In 1917, Act No. 2710[64] was enacted which allowed a wife to file for divorce in cases of concubinage or a husband to file in cases of adultery.[65] Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was enacted during the Japanese occupation, provided for 11 grounds for divorce, including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable."[66] At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared void and Act No. 2710 again took effect. [67] It was only until the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction. It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate relationships.[68] In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been resolved in Republic v. Manalo,[69] where this Court held: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce . . . validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure." Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: