4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly In the present petition, the petitioners’ designated physician – Dr. Alegre – declared Armando fit for sea service on May 12, 2003 or 92 days from the time he disembarked or signed off from the vessel on February 10, 2003. As defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, total and permanent disability means total temporary disability lasting for more than 120 days (unless the seafarer is still under treatment up to a maximum period of 240 days as the Court held in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.).[46] While Armando was initially under temporary total disability, Dr. Alegre declared him fit to work well within the 120-day mark. Viewed in this light, we find the LA and the NLRC legally correct when they refused to recognize any disability on Armando’s part as the petitioners’ designated physician had already declared his fitness to resume work. Consequently, absent any disability after his temporary disability was dealt with, he is therefore not entitled to compensation benefits under Section 20 of the POEA-SEC. Armando, acting well within his rights, disagreed with the assessment of the companydesignated physician and sought the opinion of four private physicians who arrived at a contrary finding. We note, however, that he did so only after he had already filed his complaint with the LA. Thus, Armando, in fact, had no ground for a disability claim at the time he filed his complaint, as he did not have any sufficient evidentiary basis to support his claim. More than this, the disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physician and Armando’s chosen physicians was never referred to a third doctor chosen by both the petitioners and Armando, following the procedure outlined in Section 20-B, paragraph 3 of the POEA-SEC. Had this been done, Armando’s medical condition could have been easily clarified and finally determined. Considering the absence of findings coming from a third doctor, we sustain the findings of the NLRC and hold that the certification of the company-designated physician should prevail. We do so for the following reasons: first, the records show that the medical certifications issued by Armando’s chosen physician were not supported by such laboratory tests and/or procedures that would sufficiently controvert the “normal” results of those administered to Armando at the St. Luke’s Medical Center. And second, majority of these medical certificates were issued after Armando consulted these private physicians only once. In contrast, the medical certificate of the petitioners’ designated physician was issued after three months of closely monitoring Armando’s medical condition and progress, and after careful analysis of the results of the diagnostic tests and procedures administered to Armando while in consultation with Dr. Crisostomo, a cardiologist. The extensive medical attention that Dr. Alegre gave to Armando enabled him to acquire a more accurate diagnosis of Armando’s medical condition and fitness for work resumption compared to Armando’s chosen physicians who were not privy to his case from the beginning. In several cases, we held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer’s disability.[47] In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra,[48] the Court significantly brushed aside the probative weight of the medical certifications of the private physicians, which were based merely on vague diagnosis and general impressions. Similarly in Ruben D. Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., et al.,[49] the Court elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56107 9/17