Apparently, there is no inconsistency between Article 34(i) of the Labor Code and the transfer clause under the SEC. On the contrary, the latter even complements the other by way of resolving the complex demands of seafarers whose services may entail occasional transfer from one vessel to another. Obviously, the transfer clause is not without limitations. Thus, a transfer is sanctioned only if it is to any vessel owned or operated, manned or managed by the same employer provided it is accredited to the same manning agent and that the rating of the crewmember, his wages and terms of service are in no way inferior and the total period of employment shall not exceed that originally agreed upon. In the instant case, respondents assignment to another vessel owned by European Navigation and accredited to the same manning agent, therefore, under no circumstance, violated Article 34(i) of the Labor Code. The transfer clause is deemed incorporated into the original contract; hence, the approval of the Secretary of Labor is no longer necessary. Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners merely availed of what the employment contract allows. Indeed, it was nothing more than an application of the subject provision. With regard to the finding of illegal dismissal, the pertinent provision of the Labor Code states: Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: a. Serious misconduct or wilful disobedience by the employer of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; xxx xxx x x x. In AHS Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,v[5] we held that in order that an employer may terminate an employee on the ground of willful disobedience to the formers order, regulations or instructions, it must be established that the said orders, regulation or instructions are (a) reasonable and lawful, (b) sufficiently known to the employee, and (c) in connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. In the instant case, petitioners have conscientiously apprised respondent that his repatriation was solely for documentation purposes preliminary to his transfer to another vessel which the management believes him to be more familiar with. Respondents defiance of a lawful order posed serious and considerable prejudice to the business of the employer. This Court finds that petitioners order was made within the sphere of its management prerogative. The exercise of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment must be in keeping with good faith and not be used as a pretext for defeating the rights of employees under the laws and applicable contracts.vi[6] A perusal of the records shows a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of respondents employment. As correctly viewed by the Solicitor General: Capt. Gucors refusal to disembark and turn over command of his vessel to its new master when instructed to do so caused great pecuniary damage to his employer. The vessel was at anchorage for a long time disrupting its schedule. Not only that. He was not able to take command of the