1/4/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly strict scrutiny. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of expressive conduct are subject to a lesser, but still heightened scrutiny[32] which is commonly referred to as an intermediate approach.[33] Being content-based regulations, Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.[34] In my view, the Government in this case has failed to discharge its burden in this respect. What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the State for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.[35] In this case, respondent advances the wisdom behind Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035, which is to maintain the integrity of the election process and curb the violence and atrocities that have, in recent years, marred the electoral exercise.[36] These are the same objectives behind Sections 50-A and 50-B of the Revised Election Code, which limit the period of election campaign or the conduct of partisan political activity to 150 days immediately preceding the national elections or 90 days immediately preceding the local elections. The Court in Gonzales v. Comelec[37] had found the restrictions reasonable and warranted in light of a "serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied."[38] It is beyond question that the State has an important and substantial interest in seeing to it that the conduct of elections be honest, orderly, and peaceful, and that the right to suffrage of its citizens be protected at all times. This interest, I agree, is compelling in Philippine setting, where history would readily show how the partisan political activities of candidates and their supporters have not only fostered "huge expenditure of funds on the part of candidates," but have also resulted to the "corruption of the electorate," and worse, have "precipitated violence and even deaths."[39] But what is true in one location is not necessarily true elsewhere. The prevailing substantive evils recognized in Gonzales may be endemic to the Philippines alone. Respondent has failed to demonstrate that these same evils persist in the foreign locations where overseas voting is allowed. At the same time, the prohibition under Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 is not narrowly tailored to achieve the Government's objective of preserving the integrity and order of the electoral process. The regulations completely prohibit partisan political activities with neither any limitation as to place or location nor as to the speaker or actor. Respondent, in an effort to save the regulation, proffers a resort to statutory https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65669 54/60