1/4/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.[12] (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original.) The justiciable controversy pres1ent here involves a pure question of law. We are not being called to rule on questions of fact. This direct recourse to Us via this petition is, therefore, being allowed on this basis as well, and not on petitioner's misplaced invocation of the transcendental importance doctrine. Going now to the substance of the. petition, I reiterate that my vote here is grounded on the nature of Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II) (8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 which, as impermissible content-based restrictions, do not survive strict scrutiny analysis. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[13] Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 fit this definition because these regulations restrain speech and expression before they are made. While governmental imposition of varying forms of prior restraints of speech and expression may present a constitutional issue, it does not follow, by design, that the regulations herein questioned ipso facto violate the Constitution.[14] The State may, indeed, curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate interest.[15] Any prior restraint, however, which does so comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, which the Government has the burden to justify.[16] Consequently, Our inquiry here does not end with the determination as to whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is content-neutral or content-based.[17] A content-neutral restraint is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one hat merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards.[18] A content-based restraint, on the other hand, is based on the subject ma,er of the utterance or speech.[19] In my view, Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 fall under the content-based classification. Following Ward v. Rock Against Racism,[20] the restrictions here describe speech, expression, and assembly in terms of time and manner and were not adopted because of the Government's disagreement with the message the subject speech or expression relays. There is no evidence, or suggestion, that the Government made any distinction based on the speaker's views or perspectives. Viewpoint, however, is just one aspect of free speech or expression. The Constitution's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.[21] Hence, while Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, and Section 74(II)(8) of Comelec Resolution No. 10035 do not discriminate between viewpoints, they do discriminate https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65669 52/60