1/4/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly so much on prohibiting "the message or idea of the expression"[8] per se, but rather on regulating "the time, place or manner of the expression."[9] As such, Section 36.8 should only be classified as a content-neutral regulation, and not a content-based one. Being a content-neutral regulation, case law states that the intermediate scrutiny test should be made to apply. In the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Chavez v. Gonzales,[10] he discussed: If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A contentneutral prior restraint on protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts. Courts will uphold time, place or manner restraints if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels underscoring supplied) of expression.[11] (Emphases and Following the intermediate scrutiny approach, a content-neutral regulation is valid if it meets these parameters: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on freedoms of speech, expression, and press is no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest.[12] In relation to the fourth element, a restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. In other words, the regulation must be "narrowly tailored" to fit the regulation's purpose.[13] In my view, Section 36.8 fails to satisfy this fourth parameter of the intermediate scrutiny approach,[14] and hence, unconstitutional for the reasons explained below. The purpose of the thirty (30)-day prohibition, based on respondent the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Comment,[15] is "to ensure the holding of an honest and orderly election that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot" or "to maintain public order during election day."[16] Although the law's objective is clearly constitutive of "an important or substantial governmental interest," Section 36.8's sweeping restriction of all forms of speech considered as partisan political activity abroad, without any qualification whatsoever concerning the location where such disorder may emanate, is more than essential to the furtherance of the abovestated interest. To my mind, the perceived danger of election-related disorder would only be extant when partisan political activity is allowed in places that fall within the jurisdictional reach of our election laws, e.g., within the premises of the embassy, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65669 20/60