1/4/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[33] Undoubtedly, the prohibition under the questioned legislative act restrains speech or expression, in the form of engagement in partisan political activities, before they are spoken or made. The restraint, however, partakes of a content - neutral regulation as it merely involves a regulation of the incidents of the expression, specifically the time and place to exercise the same. It does not, in any manner, affect or target the actual content of the message. It is not concerned with the words used, the perspective expressed, the message relayed, or the speaker's views. More specifically, the prohibition does not seek to regulate the exercise of the right to campaign on the basis of the particular message it conveys. It does not, in any manner, target the actual content of the message. It is easily understandable that the restriction was not adopted because of the government's disagreement with the message the subject speech or expression relays.[34] There was no intention on the part of the government to make any distinction based on the speaker's perspectives in the implementation of the regulation. [35] Simply put, regardless of the content of the campaign message or the idea it seeks to convey, whether it is for or, otherwise against a certain candidate, the prohibition was intended to be applied during the voting period abroad. The fact that the questioned regulation applies only to political speech or electionrelated speech does not, by itself, make it a content-based regulation. It is too obvious to state that every law or regulation would apply to a particular type of speech such as commercial speech or political speech. It does not follow, however, that these regulations affect or target the content of the speech or expression to easily and sweepingly identify it as a content-based regulation. Instead, the particular law or regulation must be judiciously examined on what it actually intends to regulate to properly determine whether it amounts to a content-neutral or content-based regulation as contemplated under our jurisprudential laws. To rule otherwise would result to the absurd interpretation that every law or regulation relating to a particular speech is a content-based regulation. Such perspective would then unjustifiably disregard the well-established jurisprudential distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulations. To be sure, not all regulations against political speech are content based. Several regulations on this type of speech had been declared content neutral by this Court in previous cases. In National Press Club v. COMELEC,[36] the Court ruled that while the questioned provision therein preventing the sale or donation of print space or airtime for political advertisement during the campaign period - of course, limits the right of speech and access to mass media, it does not authorize intervention with the content of the political advertisements, which every candidate is free to present within their respective COMELEC time and space. In the case of 1-UTAK[37] above-cited, the questioned prohibition on posting election campaign materials in public utility vehicles was classified as a content neutral regulation by the Court, albeit declared an invalid one for not passing the intermediate test. Being a content-neutral regulation, we, therefore, measure the same against the intermediate test, viz.: ( 1) the regulation is within the constitutional power of the https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/65669 11/60