Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him. In the light of the foregoing, we find ourselves unwilling to concede that substituted service ... may be down-graded as an ineffective means to bring temporarily absent residents within the reach of our courts. [77] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) We see no reason for holding as ineffectual the substituted service of summons, which was recounted in the Sheriff's Report dated September 8, 2005. Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to "[i]f, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be [personally] served within a reasonable time." This case pertains to alleged acts of violence against a woman. Petitioner was alleged to have physically and psychologically assaulted his wife, Maria Sheila, on multiple occasions. Maria Sheila was noted to have had to be confined in a medical facility on account of petitioner's assaults. Maria Sheila's mother found herself having to intervene to protect her daughter. The totality of these entails an urgency which, by statute, justifies the issuance of a temporary protection order even as the respondent to Mendenilla's petition was yet to be heard. This is an urgency, which the Regional Trial Court actually found to be attendant as it did, in fact, issue a temporary protection order. Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how, by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also resided at petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over petitioner's person was then validly acquired, and the dismissal of respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla's petition on this score was correctly held by Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon to be unwarranted. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 17, 2007 Decision and January 25, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94540 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur. [1] Rep. Act No. 9262, sec. 9 provides: Section 9. Who May File Petition for Protection Orders. — A petition for protection order may be filed by any of the following: .... (b) parents or guardians of the offended party[.] [2] Rep. Act No. 9262, sec. 5 provides: Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;