04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. [44] Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons."[45] To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.[46] In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place. The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No. 447 were made subject to private rights. The Court stated in Republic v. Bacas,[47] viz.: Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting 'private rights.' In Republic v. Estonilo, where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4319 was part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether x x x the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property. As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable or disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all other requirements such as length and nature of possession and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the public domain. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/61257 9/13