4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly allowed in an appeal by certiorari. He avers that should the Court review the facts of the case nonetheless, the petition must fail for lack of merit. He argues that the CA committed no error in upholding the medical opinions of his chosen physicians over the biased and erroneous certification of the company-designated physician. He bewails the petitioners’ attempt to discredit the medical certificates issued by the physicians he consulted. He stresses that the real test that should be applied in his case is whether he had lost his earning capacity due to his injury while employed with the petitioners. He laments that while the company doctor peremptorily declared that he was fit to resume sea duties as of November 6, 2007, he was never again able to have himself employed as a seaman in any capacity. Dumadag argues that the opinion of the company doctor is not binding and cannot be the sole basis of whether he is entitled to disability benefits or not, especially considering that the opinions of company physicians are generally self-serving and biased in favor of the company. Further, he maintains that the mere fact that there is no "third opinion" from a doctor appointed by the parties does not automatically mean that the opinion of the company doctor will prevail over that of his chosen physicians. He insists that in case of discrepancy between the certification of the companydesignated physician and that of the seaman’s doctor, the finding favorable to the seaman should be followed as the Court emphasized in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar. [24] He adds that as a result of his injury, he has become disabled, such that he could not find gainful employment almost four years after his last disembarkation. Lastly, Dumadag argues that he is entitled to attorney’s fees as he was compelled to litigate because of the petitioners’ refusal to heed his demand for disability benefits. Our Ruling The procedural issue Dumadag asks that the petition be dismissed outright for raising only questions of fact and not of law, in violation of the rules.[25] We find Dumadag’s position untenable. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties or any of them. Otherwise stated, there is a question of law when the issue arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the issue involves the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.[26] In the present case, the controversy arises not from the findings made by Dumadag’s physicians which contradict the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician; it arises from the application of the law and jurisprudence on the conflicting assessments of the two sets of physicians. We thus find no procedural obstacle in our review of the case. Fit-to-work assessment of the company-designated physician versus unfit-to-work certification of elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55919 5/10