Papilota-Diaz 67 was with consent. DL’s phrasal self-repetition, “the accused was there in front of you,” serves as illocutionary indicating device (IFID). DL’s illocutionary effect or the intended effect of DL’s illocutionary act to NM should have been acceptance of DL’s version of event. However illustrated in Extract 4, the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects are not compatible. The perlocutionary effect of DL’s illocutionary act to NM is incongruence to what DL has intended. Instead, of accepting DL’s version, she flouts the maxim of quantity which states “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” NM’s utterance, “He was in front of me and lying on top of me,” provides information that is more than required. Possibly, DL expects NM to answer his query with a “yes” or “no”, but NM provides additional information which is more than what is required by DL’s query. The reason here is obvious; NM does not admit to DL’s version of an event. By providing the necessary information based on her earlier testimony, she gets involved in an interactional resistance during cross examination. DL’s discourse strategy—the use of phrasal self-repetition and reformulation to proffer a contrasting version of an event—is unsuccessful. DL’s question as a speech act, in this sense, is not intended to ask or elicit information; instead, it serves as an imperative that directs NM to accept his version of an event. According to Koshik (2007), there are two different types of responses to the actions that questions initiate. Preferred responses are those that forward the action initiated by the question and promote social solidarity. On the other hand, dispreferred responses are those that block the action initiated by the question. In a segment of Extract 1, the cross-examining defense lawyer is met with dispreferred response given by the witness, “He was in front of me and lying on top of me,” because it is somehow opposing the contrasting version of an event proffered by the lawyer. Instead of simply agreeing to the lawyer’s version, she added her own version of the event. NM’s repetition of “He was on top of me,” reinforces her testimony and promotes consistency in her claim of truth. This confirms the notion that discursive control is not always maintained by the questioner—DL, but it can be seized and used to the advantage of the answerer—NM.