Joyce Kilmer entitled Trees, and the third letter although vague as to its contents, does not appear to be a love letter at all. Our inevitable conclusion: the letters are not love letters at all between AAA and [Jackie]. Even if We were to assume for the sake of argument that [Jackie] fathered AAA’s child, We are hard pressed to find malice or any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse no less than her uncle, if the same was not true. At most, We believe that [Jackie]’s testimony is a desperate attempt on his part to let Mervin off the hook, so to speak.25 (Citations omitted.) chanroble svi rtualaw li brary In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachment with a person other than the accused at the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this circumstance would not necessarily negate the truth of AAA’s statement that the appellant, her aunt’s husband, twice had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation and without her consent. We are similarly unconvinced with appellant’s defense of alibi. We have consistently held that alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.26 Moreover, we have required that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.27 In the case at bar, the testimony of defense witness Filomeno Suson made known to the trial court that the distance between the scene of the crime and the copra kiln dryer where appellant claimed to have been working the entire time during which the incidents of rape occurred can be traversed in less than an hour.28 Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis on the occasion of the rapes owing to the relatively short distance. This important detail coupled with AAA’s positive and categorical identification of appellant as her rapist demolishes appellant’s alibi since it is jurisprudentially–settled that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant.29 Having affirmed the factual bases of appellant’s conviction for two (2) counts of simple rape, we now progress to clarify the proper penalties of imprisonment and damages that should be imposed upon him owing to the conflicting pronouncements made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To recall, the Court of Appeals downgraded the penalty imposed on appellant from death (as decreed by the trial court) to reclusion perpetua. It has been established that appellant committed the aforementioned felonies with the use of a deadly weapon which according to Article 266–B, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code30 is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating circumstance present in this case, the proper penalty of imprisonment should be reclusion perpetua for each instance of rape. It is worth noting that appellant is an uncle by affinity of AAA. Following the 5th paragraph (1) of Article 266–B of the Revised Penal Code,31 a relationship within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity taken with the minority of AAA would have merited the imposition of the death penalty. However, no such close relationship was shown in this case as accused appears to be the husband of AAA’s father’s cousin. In any case, the death penalty has been abolished by the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which also mandated that the outlawed penalty be replaced with reclusion