The National Labor Relations Commission is ORDERED to dismiss
NLRC CA No. 041053-04 [NLRC-NCR OFW Case No. (M)03-10-2649-00],
entitled Marciano Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and/or
Michael Estaniel and Ventnor Navigation, Inc. considering that the claimant
was already full (sic) paid the benefits to which he was lawfully entitled to.[31]
The Court of Appeals reasoned in its decision that:
When it affirmed the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC arbitrarily set aside the
fact that Masangcay was precluded from any entitlement to disability benefits
after he was already fully recovered and declared to be fit for employment by
the company-designated physician. Under the Standard Terms, supra, the right
to compensation for disability arises only when the seafarer has been disabled
on account of his illness or injury that he suffered while in the employ of his
employer; otherwise, gross injustice would result to the petitioners.
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The NLRC could not simply sweep away the opinions of Dr.
Barrientos and Dr. Agustin, as well s that of Dr. dela Cruz, by generalizing
that company-designated or company-referred physicians were often biased in
favor of the company and that their opinions were self-serving without
specifically indicating how their specific findings were biased and why such
opinions were self-serving. The generalization was, at the very least, most
unfair to Dr. Agustin and Dr. dela Cruz, specialists in urology that covered the
ailment of Masangcay. But, above all, the arbitrariness and capriciousness
became even more blatant in the face of the fact that such company-designated
or company-referred physicians had themselves personally attended
to, examined and treated Masangcay in a professional capacity. Thereby, their
findings and conclusions were far from speculation and conjecture.
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Worst of all, the NLRC did not require the opinion of a third doctor
after Dr. Vicaldo (as Masangcays chosen physician) had disagreed with the
findings and opinions of the company-designated physician. Yet, the NLRC
needed to do so, in the face of the clear requirement of Sec. 20B, Standard
Terms, that: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
The omission underscored the commission of manifest grave abuse of
discretion consisting in the arbitrariness and capriciousness on the part of the
NLRC.[32]
The appellate court, thus, found that: