the fundamental duty of States to protect their people. Ultimately people will reject a government that abandons them on the basis that it “lacks the jurisdiction” to protect them from harm. 41 APF and GANHRI further note that, contrary to what is suggested by the respondents, the mainstream interpretation of the territorial principle does not preclude states from regulating conduct or actors outside their territory. Quite the opposite is true: the territorial principle provides ample scope for the Philippines to exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory, and for the Commission to exercise its jurisdiction to consider complaints for human rights violations carried out by corporations headquartered outside the Philippines, as long as it is satisfied that the relevant conduct is either initiated or completed within the Philippines, or because it has effects within the Philippines.42 In addition to the territorial principle, APF and GANHRI suggest that the protective principle (also known as “competence réelle”) authorizes States to protect themselves by regulating and adjudicating over conduct carried out abroad that may damage their essential security interests.43 The principle applies regardless of the place of the conduct or the nationality of the alleged offender or victim. The principle was initially applied only in the context of criminal law, but since the 1980s numerous States have applied it beyond the criminal law sphere. It is generally accepted that the application of the protective principle can only be justified by the need to protect “essential” or ���vital interests” of the State, but there is little consensus on how these should be defined. States have relied on the protective principle on several occasions to ensure environmental protection. Both the United States and Canada have relied on the protective principle to address instances of pollution in the high seas. 44 The Commission’s investigation over foreign corporations does not constitute an “act of interference” or “usurpation” of other States’ sovereignty. 45 Neither would it “be tantamount to an undue encroachment on the territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty of such other states where Respondents are domiciled and operate.” 46 The Petition before the Commission raises questions over the effects of the respondents’ conduct on the Philippines. There is therefore a clear nexus between the Philippines and the climate change impacts that are the object of the Petition under consideration.47 On this basis, APF and GANHRI conclude that the Commission could rely both on the protective principle and on the effects doctrine to assert its adjudicative jurisdiction to 41 Id. See APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 22. 43 Cf. IAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1994); APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 23. 44 Richard B. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1970); MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, 32 (2007); APF & GANHRI brief, at ¶ 24. 45 Cemex Motion to Dismiss, p. 16. 46 Shell Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam, p. 1. 47 This is supported by arguments of Special Rapporteur Knox that as scientific knowledge improves, tracing causal connections between particular emissions and resulting harms is possible. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, John H. Knox, ¶¶ 36-37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (2016). It is also supported by Jonathan Remy Nash who notes “for global air pollutants, it seems possible to claim the every nation might potentially have jurisdiction over all worldwide emissions.” See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the Extra-Territoriality of US Environmental Laws in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 164-65 (Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll and Peer Zumbansen eds. 2012) (emphasis original). 42 17