6/5/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly months since he last consulted the company-designated physician. During the latter period, Carcedo could have developed any number of conditions that may or may not be related to the injury suffered while on board the ship. Notably, Dr. Raymundo’s medical report does not specify what “condition” of Carcedo was “still in the healing process.”[48] In addition, Dr. Raymundo was only consulted after Carcedo was treated by the company-designated physician. Dr. Raymundo did not have a chance to observe Carcedo from the time of his repatriation, and was not able to monitor his condition throughout the treatments. Besides, Dr. Raymundo’s disability assessment includes a second ray amputation which he performed on Carcedo. This, and the amputation of the first toe and its metatarsal bone performed by the company-designated physician, formed the basis of Dr. Raymundo’s unfit for sea duty declaration. In contrast, the injury diagnosed by the doctor at the Yoshino Hospital in Japan and the initial findings of Dr. Cruz immediately upon repatriation only pertain to the first toe. Apart from the vague mention of a condition that was still in the healing process, there was no indication that the second ray amputation was a consequence of the injury sustained while on board. Nevertheless, Carcedo’s disability is deemed total and permanent due to the lack of a final disability assessment and of a certification of fitness for sea service from Dr. Cruz. Disability Compensation Due Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that Carcedo is entitled to full disability compensation. As a senior officer at the time he was injured, at 100% degree of disability, Carcedo is entitled to US$148,500.00.[49] Moral and Exemplary Damages and Attorney’s Fees The Labor Arbiter found no basis to award damages and attorney’s fees. The NLRC likewise did not award damages but awarded attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals did not award moral and exemplary damages but deleted the award of attorney’s fees. We find no ground to disturb the following findings of the Court of Appeals: As for attorney’s fees, the same may be awarded if petitioner acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. Here [respondents] did not act in bad faith because they in fact paid all expenses relative to Carcedo’s treatment and hospitalization. They even offered to pay disability benefits, albeit, Carcedo refused it because he wanted Grade 1, no less. Too, the assailed decision did not explain the basis for the award of attorney’s fees.[50] elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/59949 13/19