04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly also against an unduly expansive interpretation of the word “appointments” based on jurisprudential definitions that were decided under completely different sets of facts and law. Again, this latter broad-sense definition of appointment – in its largely administrative law concept – cannot be controlling in our interpretation of Section 15, Article VII. For emphasis, Section 15, Article VII is unique in the factual situation it contemplates and in restricting the President’s otherwise broad appointing power. Under E.O. No. 2, any of the following is considered a “midnight appointment” even if the date of appointment is prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban (March 11, 2010), where: 1. the appointee accepted, or took his oath, or assumed office at the time when the constitutional ban is already in effect; 2. the appointment will take effect or where the office involved will be vacant during the effectivity of the constitutional ban; 3. the appointment or promotion was made in violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. In In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (In re Valenzuela),[128] we ruled that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments, viz.: (i) those made for buying votes and (ii) those made for partisan considerations.[129] The first type obviously applies only before the elections; while the second type may apply whether the appointment was made before or after elections.[130] This observation is critical since under Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,[131] the President is ineligible for any reelection. Notably in Aytona, the Court cautioned the outgoing President not to exercise his prerogatives in a manner that would tie the hands of the incoming President through the appointment of individuals to key positions in the government. This pronouncement should not be lost to us in the present case because an outgoing President is ineligible for reelection under the 1987 Constitution. Under this situation, the objective of any prohibition against appointment, as in Aytona, is aimed at preventing the incumbent from adversely affecting his successor through partisan action. During an incumbent’s last days in office, his sole mandate should be to ensure the orderly transfer of government administration to the next President. Thus, aside from the limitations on the president’s appointing power under Section 15,[132] we need to add the constitutional disfavor that appointments made by the outgoing President carry when the elections are drawing near (and more so after the electorate has spoken), as this can be presumed to be for partisan considerations, or in furtherance or maintenance of political interest or influence, or as reward for partisan loyalties, or even for the purpose of shackling the hands of the new elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/60717 51/75