THIRD, the deceased seaman died long after his employment of a disease
which did not manifest during such employment, and which is a known fatal and
fast acting illness, such that the respondents cannot be held liable for death
benefits and damages including attorneys fees arising therefrom.[30]
On May 26, 2003, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the complaint.[31] According to the NLRC, death and burial benefits
could not be awarded to respondents. Under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract, these benefits are given if the seafarer died during the term of his
contract. Since the seafarer passed away one year after his repatriation (i.e., his
contract was already terminated), respondents were not entitled to death benefits.
The NLRC, likewise, ruled that respondents were not entitled to sickness
allowance because they did not pray for such relief in their position paper. In fact,
petitioners attached to their appeal memorandum evidence that sickness allowance
had been paid to respondents. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and the
instant case DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[32]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration[33] which the NLRC denied.
[34]
This prompted the respondents (petitioners for brevity) to file a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court before the CA.
[35]
Petitioners insisted that the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction in reversing and setting
aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in dismissing their complaint.[36]
They averred that, although Virgilio died of cardiopulmonary arrest one year
from the date of his repatriation, they were still entitled to death benefits. Citing
the ruling in Ijares v. Court of Appeals,[37] they averred that the main consideration
for compensability is that the cause of death of the deceased was contracted during
and by reason of his employment, and any non-work related factor that contributed
to its aggravation is immaterial. What is decisive is that the cause of death of the
deceased is work-related and aggravated his condition or contributed, even in a
small degree, to its development. Petitioners pointed out that the deceased was an
oiler and was exposed to different kinds of chemicals and extreme heat in the
engine room of the vessel. Contrary to respondents contention, the deceased was
not yet well when he was repatriated because he was found suffering from