04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Requirements of Ripeness and Mootness are not bars to review In contending that this Court should refrain from resolving the merits of the petitions at bar, two principal defenses were deployed by the Solicitor General: the issues raised for resolution are not ripe for adjudication and regardless of their ripeness, are moot. With due respect, the defenses cannot be sustained. To contend that an issue is not ripe for adjudication is to invoke prematurity;[19] that the issue has not reached a state where judicial intervention is necessary, hence, there is in reality no actual controversy. On the other hand, to urge that an issue has become moot concedes that judicial intervention was once proper but subsequent developments make further judicial action unnecessary. Together, mootness and ripeness act as a twopronged pincer, squeezing the resolution of controversies within a narrow timeframe.[20] First, the issues at bar are ripe for resolution. In Ohio Forestry Ass'n Inc. v. Sierra Club,[21] the following factors were identified as indicative of the ripeness of a controversy: 1. Whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; 2. Whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; 3. Whether the Court would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented; Underlying the use of the foregoing factors is first, the setting of a threshold for review and second, judicial application of the threshold to the facts extant in a controversy. I respectfully submit that where a controversy concerns fundamental constitutional questions, the threshold must be adjusted to allow judicial scrutiny, in order that the issues may be resolved at the earliest stage before anything irreversible is undertaken under cover of an unconstitutional act. Schwartz cites one vital consideration in determining ripeness, viz: In dealing with ripeness, one must distinguish between statutes and other acts that are self-executing and those that are not. If a statute is self executing, it is ripe for challenge as soon as it is enacted. For such a statute to be subject to judicial review, it is not necessary that it be applied by an administrator, a prosecutor, or some other enforcement officer in a concrete case.[22] Although Schwartz employs the term "statute," he qualifies that the principle enunciated applies to other governmental acts as well.[23] Prescinding from these parameters, it is evident that the Court is confronted with a MOA-AD that is heavily laden with self-executing components. Far from the representation of the Solicitor General, the MOA-AD is not a mere collection of consensus points,[24] still bereft of any legal consequence. The commitments made by the government panel under the MOA-AD can be divided into elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/47263 69/203