04/02/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly If the respondents-members of the GRP Peace Panel, in the conduct of the negotiation, breached these standards or failed to heed the instructions, it was not for lack of guidelines. In any event, the GRP Peace Panel is now disbanded, and the MOA-AD unsigned and "not to be signed." There is no necessity for this Court to issue its own guidelines as these would be, in all probability, repetitive of the executive issuances. The fourth exception, that the issue is "capable of repetition yet evasive of review," is likewise inapplicable in this case. In this connection, we recall Sanlakas v. Reyes, [34] where the Court dismissed the petitions which assailed as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 427, declaring a state of rebellion, and General Order No. 4, after the President had issued Proclamation no. 435 declaring that the state of rebellion had ceased to exist. Apart from the brilliant ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, particularly illuminating is the separate opinion of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban when he wrote: While the Petitions herein have previously embodied a live case or controversy, they now have been rendered extinct by the lifting of the questioned issuances. Thus, nothing is gained by breathing life into a dead issue. Moreover, without a justiciable controversy, the Petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. Be it remembered that they were filed directly with this Court and thus invoked its original jurisdiction. On the theory that the "state of rebellion" issue is "capable of repetition yet evading review," I respectfully submit that the question may indeed still be resolved even after the lifting of the Proclamation and Order, provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance. In the present case, petitioners have not shown that they have been or continue to be directly and pecuniarily prejudiced or damaged by the Proclamation and Order. Neither have they shown that this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. I would venture to say that, perhaps, if this controversy had emanated from an appealed judgment from a lower tribunal, then this Court may still pass upon the issue on the theory that it is "capable of repetition yet evading review," and the case would not be an original action for declaratory relief. In short, the theory of "capable of repetition yet evading review" may be invoked only when this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. It cannot be used in the present controversy for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Given the similar factual milieu in the case at bench, I submit that judicial review of the instant controversy cannot be justified on the principle that the issue is "capable of repetition yet evasive of review." elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/47263 197/203