4/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly 16, 1999, Lobusta was still unfit to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his symptoms. But neither did Dr. Roa declare the existence of Lobusta’s permanent disability. Again, the maximum 240-day medical treatment period had already expired. May 22, 1998 to December 16, 1999 is 19 months or 570 days. In Remigio, unfitness to work for 11-13 months was considered permanent total disability. So it must be in this case. And Dr. David’s much later report that Lobusta “ought not to be considered fit to return to work as an Able Seaman” validates that his disability is permanent and total as provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the Labor Code, as amended. In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work again as a seaman and that his disability is permanent “as he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the present or for more than 120 days.” This period is more than eight years, counted until the CA decided the case in August 2006. On the CA ruling that Lobusta’s disability is permanent since he was unable to work “for more than 120 days,” we have clarified in Vergara that this “temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.” Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as permanent total disability benefits, the maximum award under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract. We also affirm the award of US$2,060 as sickness allowance which is not contested and appears to have been accepted by the parties. On the matter of attorney’s fees, under Article 2208[33] of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees can be recovered in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer’s liability laws. Attorney’s fees are also recoverable when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.[34] Such conditions being present here, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees, which we compute as US$3,103 or 5% of US$62,060. Before we end, we note petitioners’ repeated failure to comply with our resolutions, as well as the orders issued by the tribunals below. We remind petitioners and their counsels that our resolutions requiring them to file pleadings are not to be construed as mere requests, nor should they be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Counsels are also reminded that lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well.[35] We may also dismiss petitioners’ appeal for their failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of the Supreme Court without justifiable cause.[36] In fact, we actually denied the instant petition on July 9, 2008 since petitioners failed to file the required reply to the comment filed by Lobusta.[37] On reconsideration, however, we reinstated the petition.[38] But when we required the parties to submit memoranda, petitioners again did not comply.[39] As regards the proceedings below, they did not file their position paper on time, despite the extensions granted by the Labor Arbiter.[40] Nor did they file the comment and memorandum required by the CA. [41] Finally, we note that the Labor Arbiter improperly included Miguel Magsaysay as elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/24827 9/13