The SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY just as clearly stated that NAVALES, acting for and on behalf of ARAWA BAY SHIPPING, named, constituted and appointed SEASCORP as its attorney-in-fact. To disregard the MANNING AGENCY AGREEMENT and the SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY in construing the affidavit as the appellate court did, thus upholding the literal interpretation of the affidavit against affiant SEASCORP, despite the circumstances under which it was accomplished, which circumstances throw light upon, explain and restrict the terms of the affidavit, would sacrifice the substantial rights of SEASCORP and thus work injustice, rather than promote justice. Whether SEASCORPs employees merely copied the Affidavit from a copy of the POEA, one fact is certain: SEASCORP was mistaken either through ignorance, lack of skill, or negligence. The affidavit does not thus express the true intention of the parties. In fine, SEASCORP could not have intended to assume the liabilities of SEAGULL with respect to the latters predecessor PHILIMARE-recruiter of Balatongan because the MANNING AGENCY AGREEMENT between NAVALES and SEASCORP and the SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY deemed incorporated therein clearly stated that NAVALES was therein acting for and on behalf of ARAWA BAY SHIPPING, not for and on behalf of TURTLE BAY SHIPPING on whose behalf NAVALES entered into a Manning Agreement with PHILIMARE and later with SEAGULL. WHEREFORE, the decision on review of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered dismissing the Complaint of respondent SEAGULL MARITIME CORPORATION. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur. 1 Rollo at 42-51. 2 Id. at 87-92. 3 Id. at 66. 4 Id. at 54-65. 5 Id. at 79-83. 6 Id. at 85. 7 Id. at 73-76. 8 Rollo at 84. 9 Vide note 2. 10 Id. at 20-21.