5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly hypothesis of diseases or injuries as a result of a presentation of symptoms from the patient. In many cases, diseases or the consequences of injuries that may have been suffered by the seafarer will not be apparent to one’s self. There are diseases whose gestation periods are greater than three days. Thus, it is possible that the repatriated seafarer will opt not to submit to postemployment medical examination for the simple reason that no symptom may be apparent at that time. In my view, the legal and contractual limitation of the exception to the mandatory post-employment examination to instances where the seafarer is “physically incapacitated to do so”[13] will be contrary to the constitutional requirement for protection to labor and the priority that the state should grant to health. I concur in the result in this case because it does not appear that a) Victor grounded his cause of action on tort and b) he was suffering from the kind of disease he allegedly contracted on the occasion of his employment which symptoms could not have manifested within the mandatory three-day post-employment medical examination period. Victor was also unable to prove that his illness was contracted during the term of his employment. He did not show that the natural course of the illness resulted in the permanent disability he claims. He did not support his allegation that he felt chest pains while on board.[14] Further, findings of the physician he consulted did not overcome the difficulties of showing that the illness is work-related or work-aggravated considering the lapse of more than a year from his post-employment. Some may argue that the relaxation of the three-day rule will reduce the competitiveness of Filipino seafarers. I do not believe so. The competitiveness of our seafarers is attributed to their skills, creativity, and resiliency. Competitiveness has very little to do with the mandatory three-day post-employment medical examination period. ACCORDINGLY, I join the ponencia and vote to GRANT the petition. [1] Ponencia, p. 2. [2] Id. at 8–9. [3] G.R. No. 191491, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 670 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]. [4] Id. at 673. [5] Id. at 680. [6] Id. at 681. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57627 18/19