5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly mean that he had no medical reason then. In his pleadings, he claimed that sometime in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart disease as he suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and fatigability. He, however, failed to disclose when exactly in July 2003 that he felt those manifestations whether before or after his repatriation on July 18, 2003. If it was before the said date, he should have submitted himself to a medical examination three days after repatriation.[6] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted) However, I am of the view that there is basis to revisit the scope of such a doctrine. First, current doctrine assumes that seafarers will make claims only on the basis of breaches of contractual obligations. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA regulations require certain provisions to be put in the employment contract. Necessarily, it prescribes a procedure that finds a balance of interest in both the amount and the process for recovery of compensation as a result of occupational hazards suffered by the seafarer. The cause of action in such recovery is based on contract inclusive of both statutory and regulatory provisions impliedly included in it. While this may be the theory pursued in practice, substantive law still allows recovery of damages for injuries suffered by the seafarer as a result of a tortious violation on the part of the employer. This may be on the basis of the provisions of the Civil Code as well as special laws. These special laws may relate, among others, to environmental regulations and requirements to ensure the reduction of risks to occupational hazards both for the seafarer and the public in general. In such cases, the process for recovery should not be constrained by contract. Second, even as a basis for contractual breach, the exceptions provided in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulations and current jurisprudence do not contemplate situations that may result in an unreasonable denial of the constitutional protection to labor. The current exception is provided in the same section, Section 20(B), of the POEA contract. Thus, in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC and Inductivo,[7] this court held that: Admittedly, Faustino Inductivo did not subject himself to post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his return to the Philippines, as required by the above provision of the POEA standard employment contract. But such requirement is not absolute and admits of an exception, i.e., when the seaman is physically incapacitated from complying with the requirement. Indeed, for a man who was terminally ill and in need of urgent medical attention one could not reasonably expect that he would immediately resort to and avail of the required medical examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time. It is quite understandable that his immediate desire was to be elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57627 16/19