the terms are used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering doubt as to their interchangeability, the Court enunciated in Caballo v. People [(710 Phil. 792, 805-806[2013])] that: x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as: The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."[24] (emphases and underscoring supplied) Thus, the Court, in Quimvel, observed that although the Information therein did not contain the words "coercion or influence" (as it instead, used the phrase "through force and intimidation"), the accused may still be convicted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Further, following the rules on the sufficiency of an Information, the Court held that the Information need not even mention the exact phrase "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse" for the accused to be convicted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610; it was enough for the Information to have alleged that the offense was committed by means of "force and intimidation" for the prosecution of an accused for violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 to prosper.[25] In this case, it has been established that Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse against and without the consent of AAA, who was only fifteen (15) years old at that time. As such, she is considered under the law as a child who is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act may as well be classified as a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, as afore-discussed and Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more special in nature, regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. In Teves v. Sandiganbayan:[26] It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed