'coercion and influence' as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover 'force and intimidation' as used in the Information."[36] However, Quimvel did not intend to provide any distinction on the meanings of these terms so as to determine whether an accused's case should fall under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or RA 8353 amending the RPC, much more foist any distinction depending on what the prosecution's e vidence "focused" on. In fact, the Court in Quimvel stated "the terms ['coercion and influence' and 'force and intimidation'] are used almost synonymously";[37] as such, the Court in Quimvel held that "[i]t is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different";[38] and that "the words 'coercion or influence' need not specifically appear"[39] in order for the accused to be prosecuted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. As such, the Court misconstrued the aforesaid statement in Quimvel and misapplied the same to somehow come up with Tubillo, et al.'s "focus of evidence" approach. However, the mistaken interpretation of Quimvel in Tubillo, et al. only compounds the fundamental error of the "focus of evidence" approach, which is 'to rely on evidence appreciation, instead of legal interpretation. Ultimately, there is no cogent legal basis to resolve the possible conflict between two (2) laws by ascertaining what was the focus of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Presentation of evidence leads to determining what act was committed. Resolving the application of either RA 8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 already presupposes that evidentiary concerns regarding what act has been committed (i.e., the act of sexual intercourse against a minor) have already been settled. Hence, the Court is only tasked to determine what law should apply based on legal interpretation using the principles of statutory construction. In other words, the Court need not unearth evidentiary concerns as what remains is a pure question of law - that is: in cases when the act of sexual intercourse against a minor has been committed, do we apply RA 8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA 7610? Herein lies the critical flaw of the "focus of evidence" approach, which was only compounded by the mistaken reading of Quimvel in the cases of Tubillo, et al. as above-explained. Neither should the conflict between the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and RA 8353 be resolved based on which law provides a higher penalty against the accused. The superseding scope of RA 8353 should be the sole reason of its prevalence over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. The higher penalty provided under RA 8353 should not be the moving consideration, given that penalties are merely accessory to the act being punished by a particular law. The term "'[p]enalty' is defined as '[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine'; '[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act.'"[40] Given its accessory nature, once the proper application of a penal law is determined over another, then the imposition of the penalty attached to that act punished in the prevailing penal law only follows as a matter of course. In the final analysis, it is the determination of the act