CEDAW/C/SR.748 (A) Articles 15 and 16 36. Ms. Coker-Appiah expressed concern about a number of discriminatory provisions in Philippine law. For example, the report stated that, under article 39 of the Civil Code, a married woman aged 21 or over was qualified for all acts of civil life except in cases specified by law. In what cases was a woman not qualified? Another example was the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, which required women, but not men, to submit proof of marriage, divorce or annulment when applying for a passport. 37. She would also appreciate a clarification concerning divorce. The documentation stated that the only ground for divorce in the Philippines was infidelity. However, according to other information, divorce was virtually impossible, as the only option available was nullity. If that was the case, what were the grounds for nullifying a marriage? Under other jurisdictions, a declaration of nullity implied that a marriage had been illegal from the start. 38. Ms. Bokpé-Gnacadja, noting the statement in the report that legislative provisions cited in the fourth report as being discriminatory or inconsistent with new laws still persisted in the Family Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the revised Penal Code and customary law, pointed out that the fourth report had been submitted over nine years earlier. If in that time it had not been possible to repeal discriminatory laws and apply more appropriate ones, there was a problem. There was a need to go beyond plans, programmes and strategies and to recognize that greater political will must be demonstrated and greater efforts must be made to provide information, awareness-raising and training. Sometimes there was a need to advance even in the absence of a national consensus, counting on the future to vindicate the decisions taken. 39. She asked whether the Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court as family courts were actually in operation and were effective. Noting that not all of the judicial districts created by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws had even assigned judges, she asked what the Government was doing to deal with such shortcomings. 40. She expressed concern that the Government tended to amend, rather than repeal, discriminatory laws. As an example of an amended law that was unconvincing, she pointed out that in the revised Penal 06-46703 Code, infidelity by the wife was referred to as adultery, while infidelity by the husband was termed concubinage. Thus, there was discrimination even in the definition of the offence. The rules of evidence were just as discriminatory, and the penalties were more severe for the woman’s offence than for the man’s. She questioned whether anything could usefully be amended in such a provision; it would be better simply to repeal it. 41. She asked for clarification of the terms “nullity” and “legal separation”, and whether divorce actually existed in the Philippines. 42. Ms. Šimonović, recalling the statement that some mayors banned the use of artificial contraception even though it was permitted by national policy, asked how the Government could ensure that rights acquired under the Convention were observed throughout the country. In her view, every mayor should uphold national policy, and the Government should be in a position to repeal local laws that were contrary to legally binding human rights instruments such as the Convention. 43. Ms. Gaspard welcomed the fact that the Family Code had been revised in 1997 in order to eliminate certain discriminatory measures. However, the problem remained that the Civil Code did not apply to all women in the Philippines, owing to the existence, alongside the Family Code, of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and customary law (on which the Committee had no information). Recalling that the existence of Muslim law had been briefly referred to at the preceding meeting in the context of respect for a particular culture, she said that while respecting different cultures had great merit, a culture could not be allowed to justify inequalities and discrimination. Modernization and progress demanded the secularization and standardization of law. Noting that Muslim law, in contradiction with the Civil Code, allowed marriage at the age of 15 or even 12, as well as polygamy, she asked what the Government was doing to discourage such regrettable phenomena. 44. Ms. Tan asked how the issue of maintenance for the woman was handled in the event of an annulment or legal separation. How were the interests of the children protected? How was custody decided in each of the two proceedings? She also asked how the couple’s jointly and separately owned assets were divided up. She also wished to know how many 7