5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly discretion.”[28] Then in Labao v. Flores,[29] we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus: [T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009. [30] It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory.[31] Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules.[32] Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of “[h]eavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.”[33] Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright. Notably, the CA’s November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling on the timeliness of private respondent’s motion for extension. Instead, it directly ruled on the Petition for Certiorari as seen by its statement “[t]he Court x x x resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari x x x, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days late.” To our mind, the foregoing pronouncement is an indirect acknowledgment on the part of the CA that the motion for extension was indeed filed late. Yet it opted to still entertain and “note” the Petition for Certiorari, justifying its action as being “in the interest of justice.” elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56563 5/12