CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS support human life220—indeed, based on the IPCC’s analysis (summarized in Part 1), an increase of this magnitude will have environmental impacts that seriously interfere with human rights for millions and perhaps even billions of people across the world. In November 2015 UNEP published its sixth Emissions Gap Report which provides a scientific assessment of the mitigation contributions from submitted INDCs, and compares this with the mitigation levels required to meet the target of a global average temperature increase below 2°C by 2100.221 The assessment covers 119 submitted INDCs, representing 146 countries and 85-88 per cent of global emissions. The assessment determined that full implementation of both unconditional and conditional INDCs will result in emission level estimates in 2030 that are most consistent with scenarios that limit global average temperature increase to below 3-3.5°C with a greater than 66 per cent chance.222 Therefore although the INDCs do present a real increase in the ambition level compared to a projection of current policies, there is still a large emissions gap in 2030 of 12GtCO2e (with a range of 10-15).223 In light of these findings, there is a clear need to continue increasing ambition with respect to global GHG mitigation. Thus, many countries have called for inclusion of a mechanism for gradually “ratcheting down” emissions (or “ramping up ambition”) in the upcoming Paris agreement.224 Such a mechanism could contribute to mitigation ambition, although it may not go far enough to protect human rights from climate-related harms. If emissions are not significantly lowered beneath the current commitments, there will almost certainly be environmental impacts that result in widespread interference with human rights. Indeed, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report confirmed that, to have a “likely” chance of limiting warming to 2°C, we must see “substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades, and near zero emissions… by the end of the century.”225 Thus, national governments and other actors must seek pathways to a zero-carbon economy. 3.3 Adaptation Measures and Commitments Considerable investments will be required in both developed and developing countries to adapt to climate change. Even the richest countries have yet to enact adequate legal and institutional frameworks for climate change adaptation, and will face serious challenges in terms of mobilizing resources and building adaptive capacity among their citizens, economic sectors, and infrastructure.226 But there is no question that developing countries—and in particular, least developed countries (LDCs) and geographically vulnerable countries (e.g., small island states)—face the greatest adaptation challenges. In 2014, UNEP published the Global Adaptation Gap Report which found that there is likely to be a significant gap between the resources that would be needed to adapt to 2°C of warming and the funding that will be made available through international climate funds and other finance mechanisms.227 The report cited evidence that financial commitments to adaptation have increased in recent years, and that a significant amount of adaptation funding flows to developing countries.228 However, it also noted a serious need to scale up adaptation funding, and that the existing estimates of global adaptation costs (ranging from US$70 billion-$100 billion per year) are likely to be a significant underestimate, particularly in the period after 2030.229 The bulk of international climate finance to developing countries in the past few years has been channeled towards mitigation, rather than adaptation (see discussion below). In this context, the decision of the Green Climate Fund to allocate funds 50/50 between mitigation and adaptation is welcome. 220 Petra Tschakert, 1.5°C or 2°C: A Conduit’s View from the Science-Policy Interface at COP20 in Lima, Peru, 2 Climate Change Responses 1 (2015). 221 UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report (2015). 222 Id. at XVIII. 223 Id. (Based on full implementation of conditional and unconditional INDCs). 224 Both the U.S. and China have supported language to this effect. For more on this issue, see Commitment Cycles and the Ratchet Mechanism, The Road to Paris, Climate Nexus (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.theroadthroughparis.org/negotiation-issues/commitment-cycles-and-ratchet-mechanism. 225 IPCC, Climate Change 2014, Synthesis Report, Summary of Policymakers 20 (2014). 226 IPCC (2014), supra note 4, highlights numerous examples of where adaptive capacity is lacking in both developed and developing countries, although it ultimately concludes that developed countries will fare better than developing countries. See also Christian Kroll, Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI), Sustainable Development Goals: Are the Rich Countries Ready? (2015) (concluding that 34 OECD countries are not ready to meet the sustainable development goals, including goals related to climate change adaptation); Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change 413 (Cambridge University Press 2007) (“Even with an appropriate policy framework, adaptation will be constrained by both uncertainty and technical limits to adaptation.”) 227 UNEP, The Adaptation Gap: A Preliminary Assessment (2014). 228 Id. at XIII. 229 Id. 32 I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A S S E S S M E N T