This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued. The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.55 There is no evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies. This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license. At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license was issued. However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists. Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court. II Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case. As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that