6/7/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly Dr. Gatchalian to undergo CT Sonogram to further evaluate his condition and recovery, as shown in a Medical Report dated August 19, 2010.[32] On August 24, 2010 or 197 days from repatriation, respondent was cleared to go back to work.[33] After the lapse of 120 days from the date of repatriation, respondent's treatment still continued; thus, the 240-day extension period was justified. At the time respondent filed his complaint on July 20, 2010, or 162 days since repatriation and without a definite assessment from the company-designated physician, respondent's condition could not be considered permanent and total. "[T]emporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration."[34] Both the NLRC and the CA mistakenly relied on the case of Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,[35] which applied our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad[36] that total and permanent disability refers to the seafarer's incapacity to perform his customary sea duties for more than 120 days. In Quitoriano, the seafarer filed a claim for total and permanent disability benefits on February 26, 2002 or before October 6, 2008, the date of the promulgation of Vergara, and the prevailing rule then was that enunciated by this Court in Crystal Shipping. The Court already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the case of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar[37] by enunciating that, if the maritime complaint was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the 120-day rule applies; but if the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies. In this case, respondent filed his complaint on July 20, 2010, hence, it is the 240-day rule that applies. In this case, respondent filed his complaint for total and permanent disability benefits while he was still considered to be temporarily and totally disabled; while the companydesignated physician was still in the process of assessing his condition and determining whether he was still capable of performing his usual sea duties; and when the 240-day period had not yet lapsed. From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's complaint was prematurely filed. His cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits had not yet accrued. Moreover, respondent's failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by the POEASEC, which is the law between the parties, provided a sufficient ground for the denial of his claim for total and permanent disability benefits. Section 20B(3) of the POEA-SEC provides that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing a seafarer's disability. The provision also provides for a procedure to contest the company-designated physician's findings. Respondent, however, failed to comply with the procedure when he filed his complaint on July 20, 2010 without a definite assessment yet being rendered by the companydesignated physician. Worse, he sought an opinion from Dr. Pascual, an independent physician, on August 12, 2010 despite the absence of an assessment by the companydesignated physician. The medical certificate of Dr. Pascual, nevertheless, was of no use and will not give respondent that cause of action that he lacked at the time he filed his complaint. Indeed, a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/64152 8/11