II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF FRUSTRATED RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE THERE IS NO SUCH CRIME. 8 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that appellant’s convictions should be upheld as the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is partly meritorious. This Court finds that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt appellant’s guilt for two counts of statutory rape and two counts of simple rape, there being no such crime as frustrated rape in this jurisdiction. After a thorough review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from the wellestablished rule that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best assessed by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. 9 In the present case, the trial court found Jessica’s testimony convincing, logical and credible. Moreover, the court a quo: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary . . . discerned from her demeanor the intense mental torture, embarrassment, emotional pain and bitterness she suffered whenever she was asked to recall and narrate the humiliating sexual ordeals she had gone through, and her . . . desire for justice and the punishment of her defiler. She was continually in tears while testifying and the proceeding was interrupted several times to calm her down. 10 No young woman would allow an examination of her private part and subject herself to the humiliation and rigor of a public trial if the accusations were not true, or if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. 11 We do not subscribe to appellant’s theory that the filing of the rape charges was motivated by Jessica’s dislike for him. To charge appellant with rape for the sole purpose of exacting revenge, as appellant implies in his brief, takes a certain kind of psychiatric depravity which this Court does not see in Jessica. The fact that Jessica had to undergo psychological treatment 12 after her first testimony in February 1998 belies appellant’s defense. The need for such counseling came about after the defilement she suffered in the hands of appellant. In fact, it was the incidents of rape that caused her psychological and emotional imbalance which required therapy at the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. The alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in Jessica’s testimony did not discredit her nor reveal any fabrication. Inconsistencies regarding minor details were attributable to the fact that she was recalling details of incidents that happened three years before, not to mention the fact that these details pertained to something she had very little knowledge of, being then only nine years and three months old when the first rape was committed. We have consistently ruled that errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness (a very young one at that) specially when she is recounting details of an occurrence so humiliating, so painful and, in this case, so alien as rape. 13 Appellant makes much of the fact that two incidents of rape happened inside the room where the other children were sleeping. This Court has repeatedly held that rape can be committed in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping, in a