Dissenting Opinion -6- G.R. No. 224469 Thus, We acquitted the accused in Saguin for the following reasons: (1) there exists a lawful cause for the failure to remit, specifically, the devolution or transfer of the remittance functions from the hospital to the local government as a result of the passage of the Local Government Code; and (2) there is no showing offraudulent intent because failure was actually brought about by a confusion caused by the devolution. Clearly, the Court took the resulting confusion into account in order to show an absence of fraudulent intent. But it was never ruled that this confusion was a lawful cause for the failure to remit. The majority cannot, therefore, correctly rely on Saguin to conclude that due to an apparent confusion arising from the recognition of IP rights in the IPRA, there is reasonable doubt as to whether petitioners' act of cutting was done without the requisite authority. To repeat, the offense in this case is the cutting of any forest product without any governmental authority. Unlike the offense in Saguin where an absence of fraudulent intent acquits, intent of an accused herein is wholly immaterial. It is an established fact that P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As such, mere commission of the prohibited acts consummates the offense even in the absence of malice or criminal intent. 16 This is the reason why the Court, in Jdanan, et al. v. People, 17 rejected the defense that the accused were merely following orders to load lumber in their truck. Indeed, it suffices to prove the act of cutting or possessing trees or any forest product from any forest land, alienable and disposable public lands, or even private lands, and without any authority from the DENR. Owing to the very mala prohibita nature of an offense when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 18 ' Accordingly, in prosecutions thereunder, claims of good faith are by no means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. 19 This notwithstanding, the majority insists on a confusion that springs from the amendments undergone by the subject Section 77 of P.D. No. 705. Specifically, it adopts the arguments of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa asserting that in light of the evolution and history thereof as well as the changes and amendments it underwent, it can be assumed that the "authority" required by the law has been expanded and is no longer confined to those granted by the DENR. The use of the phrase "any authority" in the 16 17 18 19 A Monge, et. al. v. People, 571 Phil. 472,481 (2008). 783 Phil. 429 (2016); cited also in the Dissenting Opinion Gf Justice Mario V. Lopez.{/'r Tigoy v. Court ofAppeals, 525 Phil. 613,624 (2006). Monge v. People, supra note 16, at 479. ,/