The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains no other qualifications that could limit either spouse's capacity to remarry. In Garcia v. Recio,[76] this Court reversed the Regional Trial Court's finding of the Filipino spouse's capacity to remarry since the national law of the foreign spouse stated certain conditions before the divorce could be considered absolute: In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.[77] Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of the Family Code provides: Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried, the National Statistics Office having found no impediment to the registration of his Marriage Certificate.[78] The validity of respondent's subsequent marriage is irrelevant for the resolution of the issues in this case. The existence of respondent's Marriage Certificate, however, only serves to highlight the absurd situation sought to be prevented in the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:[79] It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. . . . .... Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.