6/8/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly answer for their own claims. Thus, they should be allowed to intervene, even if it is only to oppose the claims of the manning agent and crewmen. The Court finds no merit in this argument. The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.[3] Petitioners failed to meet both requirements. Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.[4] Petitioners, being co-creditors, are not the parties liable for the claims of the manning agent and crewmen. Also, petitioners’ remedies as unpaid mortgagees remain preserved as the collection case will not preclude the foreclosure of the vessel. Lastly, that petitioners would be adversely affected by the disposition of the property is contingent upon two eventualities: 1) the successful foreclosure on the vessel; and 2) the proceeds of the sale being insufficient to cover the loan amount. Clearly, the outcome of the collection case has no “direct” effect on petitioners. As for the second requisite for intervention, petitioners’ rights were already protected through their extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, while on the other hand, the rights of the manning agent and crewmen, who are the original plaintiffs, have been unduly delayed or prejudiced. The decision of the RTC, rendered in October 30, 1987, has not attained finality, even though the actual judgment obligors did not appeal. The only parties prolonging the case are the intervenors, in the persons of petitioners. Petitioners claim to possess legal interest by citing the case of International Banking Corp. v. Pilar Corrales, et al.,[5] which stated that a lien or statutory right of preference clothed the intervenor with an interest in the subject-matter in litigation. Petitioners also claim that their intervention was in the nature of an intervention pro interesse suo. Citing Joaquin v. Herrera,[6] they argue that intervention pro interesse suo is a mode of intervention wherein a stranger desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right which is the subject matter of litigation without becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant. The Court finds the two aforecited cases not applicable to the present case. In the International Banking Corp. case, intervention was allowed because the intervenor had a superior right of preference over the subject property and he had sought to enforce his own claims against the defendant and to foreclose on the said subject property. Petitioners herein prayed that they be allowed to intervene, on the basis of their secondary right as unpaid mortgagees, merely to oppose the claims of respondents and not for the purpose of enforcing their own claims. In the Joaquin case, the plaintiff sought to compel the local officials of Caloocan to elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/45348 3/5