For their part, the respondents claim that the instant petition involves a pure question of fact, outside the scope of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and the CA are supported by evidence sufficient to justify the decision. The respondents also point out that the petitioner received a copy of the CA Decision on May 13, 2003, and filed the Motion for Reconsideration only on May 29, 2003; thus, the requisite motion for reconsideration initiated by the petitioner before the CA was filed out of time (one day late). Consequently, the instant petition for review was, likewise, filed out of time. The respondents also claim that the validity, legality and applicability of the POEA standard employment contract has been upheld by this Court, and under Article 1315 of the Civil Code, the contract is the law between the parties. The respondents also point out that the deceased seafarer died more than one year after the termination of the employment contract. They allege that death benefits claims will only prosper if the seafarer died during the term of the contract. Assuming that the instant claim had been anchored on a disability or ailment acquired during the term of the contract, the ailing seaman is still required to report for a medical check-up within three working days from the date of arrival, otherwise, benefits under the POEA standard employment contract would be nullified. The respondents point out that in this case, the deceased seaman failed to report within the said period. Thus, the respondents pray that the instant petition for review be dismissed for utter lack of merit and for being filed out of time. The petitioner counters that, contrary to the respondents’ contentions, the Court has the power to review findings of facts under certain exceptions. In this case, it is very clear that the decision appealed from was based on a misapprehension of facts and that the conclusion arrived at by the appellate court was "manifestly mistaken and impossible." The petitioner admits that the diagnosis was made a month after the contract ended, but insists that her husband could not have acquired the disease in only one month. The primary consideration in this case should be the chain of events and not the strict wordings of the contract. To support her contention, the petitioner cites Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC,23 where the Court held that the POEA standard employment contract was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of the Filipino seamen; as such, its provisions must be construed and applied fairly for the benefit of seamen and their dependents. The petition must fail. The applicable provision in the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessel is not Section 20(A)24 on compensation and benefits for death, but Section 20(B)3, to wit: B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS: 3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. In this case, it is not disputed that Rodolfo failed to submit himself to the mandatory post-employment medical examination. The respondent manning agency found out about his confinement only through the petitioner, who asked for assistance in claiming her husband’s retirement benefits. Indeed, while compliance with the reporting requirement under the Standard Employment Contract can be dispensed with, there must likewise be basis for the award of death compensation. Without a post-medical examination or its equivalent to show that the disease for which the seaman died was contracted during his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment, the respondents cannot be made liable for death compensation. Thus, in the absence of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be presumed to have increased the risk of contracting the disease, in this case, chronic renal failure. In fact, in Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC,25 the Court held that the death of a seaman even during the term of employment does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and the seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 26 The case of Wallem v. NLRC27 is not applicable here. In that case, the deceased seaman was signed-off from the vessel two months from the expiration of the employment contract and was already seriously ill when discharged from the vessel. The Court held that the deceased seaman in that case failed to comply with the 72-hour reporting requirement under the POEA Standard Employment Contract since he was already physically incapacitated to do so. In this case, the deceased was not similarly physically incapacitated. In fact, the records show that Rodolfo himself claimed his leave pay and one-day travel allowance on December 5, 1997.28 While strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits,29 the Court cannot altogether disregard the provisions of the Standard Employment Contract. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC,30 the Court resolved the issue of whether the physician, who makes the pronouncement as to the existence and grade of the seafarer’s disability, should be POEA accredited. The Court’s discussion therein is quite instructive: … In order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the "company-designated" physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter’s employment. There is no provision requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to substantiate their claim. If accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA, it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically using the term "accreditation" in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote its intention. For instance, under the Labor Code, it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security System or the Government Service