death compensation to be paid by the Social Security System to the beneficiaries of a deceased member, to which proposition Florentina concedes. We agree. The remedy availed by Sugata-on in filing the claim under the New Civil Code has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.   In the case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company,[18] we declared that the employees may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy. The exception is where the claimant who had already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.[19]   Stated differently, save for the recognized exception, an employee cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously but has the option to proceed by interposing one remedy and waiving his right over the other. As we have explained in Floresca, this doctrinal rule is rooted on the theory that the basis of the compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code, thus:   The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 D.J.S. 36).   In other words, under compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo v. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his