4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly duty. In contrast to the said findings, the company doctor failed to substantiate her conclusion that complainant is "fit to work."[15] LA Carpio noted that the petitioners suddenly stopped rehiring Dumadag despite the fact that they had continuously employed him for at least fifteen (15) times for the last 15 years. He viewed this as the most convincing proof that Dumadag’s inability to work was due to the illness he contracted in the course of his last employment. On appeal by the petitioners, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in a resolution dated July 30, 2009, affirmed LA Carpio’s decision.[16] On September 28, 2009, it denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[17] The petitioners then elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, contending that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the "fit-to-work" assessment of the company-designated physician. The Assailed CA Decision The CA denied the petition in its decision of August 31, 2010.[18] It upheld the NLRC rulings in toto. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it sustained LA Carpio’s award of permanent total disability benefits to Dumadag on the basis of the findings of the physicians of his choice. Also, as LA Carpio and the NLRC did, it noted that Dumadag was not rehired by the petitioners after he was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician and neither was he able to secure employment through other manning agencies. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of November 2, 2010.[19] Hence, the petition. The Petition The petitioners contend that the CA committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion in: (1) ruling that Dumadag is entitled to permanent total disability benefits based solely on the findings of his personal physicians; (2) disregarding the procedure in the POEA-SEC in disputing the assessment of the company-designated physician; (3) adopting the NLRC ruling that the non-rehiring of Dumadag is proof that his inability to work was due to the illness he contracted during his last employment; and (4) affirming the award of attorney’s fees despite the fact that their denial of his claim was in good faith and based on just and valid grounds. The petitioners stress, with respect to the first assignment of error, that under Section 20(B)(2) of the POEA-SEC and under the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), it is the company-designated physician who determines the seafarer’s degree of disability or his fitness to work. They point out in this respect that not only is the company-designated physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seafarer’s fitness to work or the degree of his disability, but more importantly, he or she is the one who examines and treats the seafarer, thus lending accuracy to his or her evaluation. elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55919 3/10