Papilota-Diaz 59 Such a sentence is called performative in contrast to constative which is used mainly for saying something rather than doing something. Austin (1962) labels the act of doing while speaking as speech acts. Austin (1962) posits three types of acts that speakers simultaneously perform while speaking: (1) locutionary act – act of speaking which involves construction of sequences of sounds that can be interpreted according to grammatical conventions; (2) illocutionary act (Austin’s central innovation) – act done in speaking by means of the conventional force of the locutionary act; and, (3) perlocutionary act – act produced by the uttering of a particular locution, the consequences or effects of such locution regardless of its conventional force. Within speech act, the act performed by an utterance is referred to as its illocutionary force, and the effect this act has on the hearer is referred to as its perlocutionary effect. Austin (1962) likewise presents five basic types of illocutionary acts, which have been reclassified by Searle (1976), and Searle and Vanderveken (1985): (1) assertives (tell people how things are): assert, claim, affirm, state, deny, disclaim, etc.; (2) directives (try to get people to do things): direct, request, ask, urge, tell, require, demand, command, etc.; (3) expressives (express feelings and attitudes): apologize, think, condole, congratulate, etc.; (4) declaratives (bring about changes through utterances): declare, resign, adjourn, appoint, nominate, etc.; and (5) commissives (commit to some future actions): commit, promise threaten, vow, pledge, swear, accept, consent, etc. To account for how illocutionary acts do their work, Austin (1962, 14-5) introduces a number of criteria which he calls felicity conditions. For a speech act to be “happily” or successfully performed, these are the conditions that must be observed: (1) conventionality of procedure; (2) appropriate number and types of participants and circumstances; (3) complete execution of procedure; (4) complete participation; (5) sincerity conditions; and, (6) consequent behaviour. Searle (1969) further distinguishes between the effects achieved using Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID; literal illocutionary force) and the effects achieved indirectly as products of the speech act. A classic example is in the utterance, “Could you pass the salt?” which appears to be a question but when uttered in a dining table, a common achieved effect is to make the addressee be