Separate Concurring Opinion 13 G.R. No. 224469 liable under P.D. 705 for logging one (1) dita tree within their ancestral domain. In this regard, I do not find that this Court's decisions in Lim v. Gamosa 45 and PEZA v. Carantes 46 are determinative of the issue presented in this petition. None of these cases deal with criminal liability arising from a prohibitory law regulating activities of indigenous people within their ancestral domains. At the risk of being repetitive, my vote is simply a result of my determination that the .circumstances do not establish petitioners' intent to perpetrate the offense under Sec. 77 of P.D. 705. It is in no way a pronouncement that members of ICCs are absolutely exempted from securing permits to utilize resources. Neither should it be construed as a judicial sanction of small-scale logging or any form of commercial activity involving wood or timber, nor the use of indigenous people as conduits or accomplices to illegal logging operations. In any case, no evidence has been presented that indigenous people or ICCs have, in fact, been engaged or largely responsible in the problem of illegal logging here in the Philippines. In my opinion, P.D. 705, which took effect in 1975, should be viewed under the prism of the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the right ofICCs. The noble objectives of P.D. 705 in protecting our forest lands should be considered in conjunction with the Constitution's mandate of recognizing our indigenous groups as integral to our nation's existence. 47 I submit that under our present Co1:stitµtional and legal regime, courts cannot summarily ignore allegations or factual circumstances that pertain to indigenous rights or traditions, but must instead carefully weigh and evaluate whether these are material to the resolution of the case. As rightfully noted by Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe, the enactment of various laws manifests the State's consent to the IPs' limited utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral lands and/or domains. It is my belief that such laws modify the meaning of intent to perpetrate and justify a solicitous approach in determining culpability under Sec. 77 of P.D. 705 if the accused is a member of an ICC. This does not mean, however, that the Court should create a novel exempting circumstance in the prosecution of illegal logging activities. I am merely proposing that courts make a case-to-case· determination whether an accused's ties to an ICC affects the prosecution's accusations or the defense of the accused. Simply put, courts should not ignore indigeneity in favor of absolute reliance to the traditional purpose of criminal prosecution, which are deterrence and retribution. 48 As in this case, if there is proof that the --- 45 46 47 48 ----~ ~--·-·-, G.R. No. 193964, 02 December 2015. G.R. No. 181274, 23 June 2010, 635 Phil. 541-554. See Ha Datu Tmvahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, 20 March 2019. See Cunneen, Chri:s, Sentencing, Punishment and Indigenous People in Australia, Journal of Global Indigeneity, 3(1), 2018,< ):filp_~;;//r9_.3.10w.edu.audgj/vo13/issl/4>(visited on 07 July 2020); See also