6/7/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly 1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3. when there is grave abuse of discretion; 4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5. when the findings of fact are conflicting; 6. when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; 8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9. when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent; 10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [and] 11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[13] Whether or not petitioner's illness is compensable is essentially a factual issue. Yet this Court can and will be justified in looking into it, considering the conflicting views of the NLRC and the CA.[14] For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (l) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the workrelated injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.[15] The POEA-SEC defines a work-related injury as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment," and a work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."[16] For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor of the seafarer that these illnesses are work-related.[17] Notwithstanding the presumption, We have held that on due process grounds, the claimant seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.[18] This is because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions.[19] In order to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient – direct causal relation is not required.[20] Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.[21] A careful review of the findings of the NLRC and the CA shows that petitioner was able to meet the required degree of proof that his illness is compensable as it is workconnected. The Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, correctly ruled that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease, thus: elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/64110 5/11