4/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly the NLRC decision challenged before it.[17] emphasis supplied) (citations omitted; italics and Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field.[18] Nor do we substitute our “own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.”[19] The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.[20] Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases where we, in the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction, may be urged to look into factual issues raised in a Rule 45 petition. For instance, when the petitioner persuasively alleges that there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support the factual findings of the tribunal or court a quo,[21] as Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if supported by substantial evidence.[22] The petition specifically questions two factual findings made below: First, that Serna’s illness was acquired during the term of his employment contract; and second, that he duly presented himself to Career Phils. for a post-employment medical examination.[23] Work-relatedness of illness is irrelevant to the 1996 POEA-SEC We dismiss at the outset the petitioners’ contention on the causal connection between Serna’s illness and the work for which he was contracted. In support, they cite “The World Book Illustrated Home Medical Encyclopedia,” particularly its 1984 Revised Print, in stating that the causes of toxic goiter or thyrotoxicosis are unknown.[24] The causal connection the petitioners cite is a factual question that we cannot touch in Rule 45.[25] The factual question is also irrelevant to the 1996 POEA-SEC. In Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission,[26] we expressly declared that illnesses need not be shown to be work-related to be compensable under the 1996 POEA-SEC, which covers all injuries or illnesses occurring in the lifetime of the employment contract. We contrast this with the 2000 POEA-SEC[27] which lists the compensable occupational diseases. Even granting that work-relatedness may be considered in this case, we fail to see, too, how the idiopathic character of toxic goiter and/or thyrotoxicosis excuses the petitioners, since it does not negate the probability, indeed the possibility, that Serna’s toxic goiter was caused by the undisputed work conditions in the petitioners’ chemical tankers. Substantial evidence exists that Serna acquired his illness during his employment elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/55380 5/13