4/29/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly within the period of 35 days upon his disembarkation, they have not presented any concrete proof or medical expert opinion to substantiate their claim. The case of Wallem v. NLRC[34] relied upon by petitioners finds no application in this case. In Wallem, the deceased seaman was discharged from the vessel two months before the expiration of his employment contract. We ruled then that the only plausible reason why he was all of a sudden and with no rational explanation discharged from the vessel was the finding that he was already in a deteriorating physical condition when he left the vessel. Our conclusion was buttressed by the events that transpired immediately upon his arrival in the Philippines, i.e., he was hospitalized two (2) days later and died three (3) months after. Thus, we held then that the deceased seaman's failure to comply with the 3-day post-employment medical examination requirement was excusable as he was already physically incapacitated to do so since he was already ill when he left the vessel. We also ruled that even assuming that the seaman's ailment as argued by the employers was pre-existing, i.e., contracted prior to his employment on board the vessel, was not a drawback to the compensability of the disease. Thus, we said that it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death. In contrast to this case, Enrique's failure to comply with the mandatory 3-day reporting was not justified at all as there was no showing that he was physically incapacitated to do so. Moreover, as admitted, Enrique had no symptoms of any illness during his employment and even after his arrival in the Philippines on December 2, 1996. And there was no concrete evidence to establish that his employment contributed to his illness. Finally, considering that the NLRC decision, as affirmed by the CA, dismissed Enrique's complaint not on the ground of prescription but after finding that the latter failed to adduce evidence that he contracted his illness during his employment with respondents and since he failed to submit himself to the post-employment medical examination without justifiable reason, we find no need to discuss petitioners' claim that the instant complaint was not barred by prescription. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 30, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 70415, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur. August 8, 2013 N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T Sirs/Mesdames: elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/56060 7/10